"SECOND COLLISION" LIABILITY:
THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY
Harvey M. Sklaw*
INTRODUCTION

Automobile cases, which comprise the majority of negligence
actions, may be viewed as grounded on two broad and separate legal
theories. The first is the unadorned negligence action directed solely
at the driver, or, on an agency basis, the driver and the owner. Additionally, these cases are frequently concerned with the alleged contributory negligence of the plaintiff himself. While such cases may become complicated by virtue of particular factual circumstances, the
underlying legal aspects remain simple and straightforward. The test
of liability in these cases, as in all other basic negligence suits, remains
constant-whether the defendant negligently breached his legally imposed duty toward the plaintiff and thereby proximately caused him
injury.1 Although similar in theory, the automobile cases of this type
may be distinguished from other negligence cases by sheer weight of
2
numbers.
The second broad category of automobile cases encompasses those
wherein the injured plaintiff alleges that the party whose act or acts
culpably caused his injury was the manufacturer of the car involved.
Specifically, the gravamen of these suits is that due to some fault on the
part of the manufacturer there was a flaw in the vehicle in question. A
prime example is the grandfather of the automobile cases, MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co.8 In MacPhersonthe plaintiff proved that a wooden
* A.B., Rutgers University; M.A., Montclair State College; J.D., Seton Hall University;
Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.
1 These legal aspects are set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965),
which provides that
negligence is conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. It does not include conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others.
2 In 1971 the number of registered motor vehicles in the United States totaled 115,000,000, while the number of accidents reported was 16,400,000. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL,
ACCHDENT FACTS 40 (1972). This extraordinary number of accidents has resulted in auto
negligence cases dominating the civil calendars of our courts. For example, as of August,
1972, there were approximately 24,000 automobile negligence cases pending on the civil
calendars of New Jersey superior and county courts, as opposed to approximately 20,000
civil cases of another nature. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE DIRCTOR OF THE COURTS 52 (1971-72).

3 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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wheel on his new car collapsed proximately causing his injuries. He
further proved that this collapse was caused by negligence, attributable
to the defendant, in failing to properly inspect the wheel supplied by
another manufacturer. The court noted that "[t]he question to be determined is whether the defendant owed a duty of care and vigilance to
any one but the immediate purchaser. ' 4 Implicit in the court's quaere
was the assumption that a duty to the immediate purchaser did in fact
exist. The court then proceeded to answer its question in the affirmative by deciding the case on a negligence theory rather than on one of
contract, thus avoiding the privity requirement which had barred recovery in the past. 5
In more recent years, liability had been posited on the relatively
modem theories of either strict liability in tort or breach of implied
warranty. These concepts differ from the MacPherson position in that
theoretically, proof of the defendant's negligence is no longer a prerequisite for the success of the plaintiff. This is demonstrated in the
leading case on the warranty theory, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.6 Mrs. Henningsen was driving her new car on a highway when
she heard a loud noise from under the hood. The steering wheel spun
uncontrollably in her hands, and the car veered into a brick wall. The
court noted that the condition of the car after the accident made it impossible to determine if any defects existed in the steering mechanism
prior to the accident. The only evidence of causality was summarized
as follows:
The insurance carrier's inspector and appraiser of damaged
cars, with 11 years of experience, advanced the opinion, based on
the history and his examination, that something definitely went
"wrong from the steering wheel down to the front wheels" and
that the untoward happening must have been due to mechanical
defect or failure; "something down there had to drop off or break
loose to cause the car" to act in the manner described.7
While this testimony was held to be adequate to support the finding of
a defect in plaintiff's vehicle, it does not even allude to negligence as
4 Id. at 385, 111 N.E. at 1051.
5 Id. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053. Under the doctrine of privity, a party was liable for
negligence in the construction, sale, or manufacture of an article to only those with whom
he had entered into contractual relations. Other parties who might be injured by a negligently made product were left without a cause of action. For a further discussion of this
concept, see Chief Justice Bartlett's dissent. Id. at 395-401, 111 N.E. at 1055-57.
6 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
7 Id. at 369, 161 A.2d at 75.
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being the cause of it. To emphasize this point, the court concluded
that "[r]ecovery of damages does not depend upon proof of negligence."8
Although Henningsen, couched in the language of implied warranties, predates the theory of strict liability as set forth in Restatement
(Second) of Torts, section 402 A,9 it is clearly a landmark on the path to
cases decided on the basis of both the section 402 A theory and the one
espoused in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.x0 In Greenman,
the complaint involved a defective power tool. The California Supreme
Court set forth the rule that
[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human
being."
The court then discussed at some length the rationale for applying the
theory of strict liability to personal injury cases based on defective
products and concluded:
The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products on the market rather than
by the injured
12
persons who are powerless to protect themselves.
8 Id. at 372, 161 A.2d at 77. In order to decide the case on the contractual basis of
implied warranty, the court was forced to dispose of the problem created by the lack of
privity between Mrs. Henningsen and the defendants. The court recognized that Mrs.
Henningsen was a person who reasonably might be expected to use the automobile. The
court then decided that
an implied warranty of merchantability chargeable to either an automobile
manufacturer or a dealer extends to the purchaser of the car, members of his
family, and to other persons occupying or using it with his consent. It would be
wholly opposed to reality to say that use by such persons is not within the anticipation of parties to such a warranty of reasonable suitability of an automobile
for ordinary highway operation.
Id. at 414-15, 161 A.2d at 100.
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
10 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
11 Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
12 Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
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In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,' 8 the same court demonstrated

that the rule of Greenman was to be applied to automobiles. Vandermark concerned the alleged defect in the master cylinder of a 1958
Ford. The court held that the plaintiff need only prove the defect, not
4
its cause, to support his action.1

The factors which distinguish the negligence approach from the
one taken under section 402 A were discussed at some length in MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co. 15 Plaintiff, alleging steering failure, produced
an expert who testified to finding some metal flakes in the gear mechanism of the car in question which he theorized could cause temporary
steering tightness. Ford argued that such a contention was mere conjecture which failed to meet the burden of proof required of MacDougall. In affirming the verdict for the plaintiff, the superior court
concurred with the defendant's objection up to a point, stating that
"if the evidentiary standards of negligence govern § 402A actions, mere
proof of a malfunction would not sustain the verdict for appellees."' 8
However, the court then concluded that
§ 402A actions are governed by evidentiary standards of warranty
law rather than negligence and that under these standards the occurrence of a mechanical malfunction evidences a "defective condition" without proof of the specific defect in design or assembly
17
causing the malfunction.
Thus, under this theory, a malfunction proves the defect without the
need to pinpoint it or prove that it was the result of negligence.
The expansion of the breach of warranty approach and the advent
of strict liability have not, however, entirely mooted negligence as a
theory of liability where a defect in an automobile is alleged. For
example, in Holman v. Ford Motor Co.,18 plaintiff, suing for damages
suffered when the brakes failed on his new 1966 Thunderbird, based his
action not only on the theory of breach of implied warranty, but also
on negligence. On appeal from a verdict for the defendant, the judgment was reversed because the trial court had refused to instruct the
jury on the applicability of res ipsa loquitur, a basic negligence principle.

19

61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
Id. at 260, 391 P.2d at 170, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
15 214 Pa. Super. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969).
16 Id. at 387-88, 257 A.2d at 678.
17 Id. at 388, 257 A.2d at 678.
18 239 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
19 Id. at 45-46. Since strict liability in tort appears to be a fusion of the proof aspects
of breach of warranty with the foreseeability aspects of negligence, it seems that the Florida
13

14
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The effects of this over-lapping of legal theories is demonstrated in
Brownell v. White Motor Corp.20 The court characterized the case as a
"products liability action for damage to the truck incurred when it
went off the road." 21 The case went to the jury on the theory of strict
liability. In affirming the verdict below, the court quoted its own previous holding in Vanek v. Kirby22 as follows:
"For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the complaint, we may
assume that plaintiff would be able to produce evidence from which
the jury could infer that as the vehicle was driven down the highway the driver found it impossible to control it because of some
defect in its mechanism. . . . If plaintiff carries his burden of
proving that the defect was attributable to defendant's conduct
rather than to some other cause, he need not identify the 2specific
3
defect which caused the vehicle to become uncontrollable."
Of particular interest is the court's observation in Brownell that the
plaintiff in Vanek had used the terminology of implied warranty. Even
though the plaintiff's theory in Brownell was that of strict liability in
tort, the court found the language of Vanek controlling.
However, the proposition that a finding of breach of warranty in a
personal injury action is tantamount to a finding of strict liability in
tort is not without its problems. In Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler
Center, Inc., 24 the plaintiff alleged that she suffered carbon monoxide
poisoning approximately three weeks after receiving delivery of a
Plymouth Fury I station wagon. She attributed her injury to missing
body drain plugs and a loose clamp on the exhaust line which she
alleged constituted a defective condition. The trial court sent the case
to the jury on the theories of negligence and breach of implied warranty, but dismissed that portion of the suit based on the theory of
strict liability. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alaska decided to
adopt the theory of strict liability. Then, however, it proceeded at some
length to discuss the Greenman theory as compared with that of section
402 A. Clearly, this court saw the thrust of Greenman as being broader
-one approaching enterprise liability. It quoted nearly verbatim the
language of Greenman:
court was in a position to adopt strict liability in tort as the operative theory of this case.
It chose, however, not to do so.
20 260 Ore. 251, 490 P.2d 184 (1971).
21 Id. at 253, 490 P.2d at 185. The plaintiff had purchased the new truck only three
weeks before the accident. At trial he testified that "he heard a loud bang in the front end,"
after which the truck dropped down to the roadway. Id.
22 253 Ore. 494, 450 P.2d 778 (1969).
23 260 Ore. at 255, 490 P.2d at 186 (quoting from 253 Ore. at 502, 450 P.2d at 782).
24 454 P.2d 244 (Alas. 1969).
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The purpose of imposing such strict liability on the manufacturer and retailer is to insure that the cost of injuries resulting from
defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves. Sales warrantiesserve this purpose
25
fitfully at best.
This last sentence was directed at the appellees' contention that the
instruction to the jury on the warranty count effectively covered the
same ground that appellant's proposed, but rejected, instruction on
strict liability would have covered. Therefore, appellant had not been
prejudiced. The court did not agree:
Appellees' interpretation of the present status of the law of warranty is based to a large extent on opinion and fails to give proper
weight to basic differences in the two theories such as that liability
may be stipulated away by contract but cannot be avoided in
tort.26
Justice Rabinowitz, in a separate opinion, saw the matter differently.
He noted that there was "considerable authority to the effect that
'defect' in strict liability terms is co-extensive with that of the implied
warranty of fitness for reasonable use."
Several considerations lead to the conclusion that Justice Rabinowitz was more accurate than the majority in his appraisal. For example,
Henningsen never used the term strict liability in tort, but rather
the decision was phrased entirely in warranty language. Nonetheless,
it is clear that Henningsen is in fact a case in strict liability. 28 Furthermore, Henningsen, faced with a contractual limitation on liability
peculiar to warranty actions apparently not at issue in Clary, disposed
of it without any serious difficulty. Thus, it appears that the majority
in Clary may have arrived at a distinction without a difference. Perhaps
the court was really thinking in extra-legal terms, and if one goes
25 Id. at 248 (emphasis added). For an in depth discussion of the theory of enterprise
liability, see Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499 (1961); Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance
of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961).
26 454 P.2d at 249.
27 Id. at 252 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (footnote omitted).
28 This conclusion is based on an examination of cases decided subsequent to Henningsen which cite it as support for the development of strict liability. Further support is
derived from a careful reading of the case. Once the court had rendered the contract defenses valueless, the resulting proofs and ultimate holding were precisely the same as they
would have been had 402 A been formulated and adopted at that time.
See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MIN. L. .Rv. 791 (1966).
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beyond the absolute legal meaning of the pertinent terms, their conclusion becomes more convincing. The court stated:
Since appellant did not prevail it is not possible to infer that the
facts of her case were viewed as favorably by the jury under the
as they might have been under strict liability
warranty instructions
29
instructions.
The instructions proposed by plaintiff were:
A manufacturer is strictly liable when an article he places on the
market proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human
being80
And a
proves to
retailer is strictly liable when he sells an article which
3
have a defect that causes injury to a human being. '
The instruction given was that
"there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be merchantable.
least fit for the ordinary
By this we mean that the goods are at 32
purposes for which such goods are used."
Furthermore, the jury was instructed that if the plaintiff was to prevail
the breach of warranty had to be a proximate cause of the loss sus33
tained.
Even assuming an absolute parallel in legal implication, it is
specious to suggest that these two sets of instructions would have the
same emotional and intellectual impact on the average jury. Clearly,
the strict liability instructions propounded by the plaintiff carry stronger
connotative impact. They are couched in more familiar language and
are more directly aimed at the implications of the manufacturer's fault
with respect to the individual who suffers as a result. Conversely, the
instruction given has a rather cold, impersonal tone. Thus, the conclusion drawn appears to be a contradiction, since the theory for finding
454 P.2d at 249.
Id. at 245.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 251 (as quoted in Justice Rabinowitz's dissent).
33 It is of interest to note that the exact wording of the court was that "the warranty
was breached and that the breach of warranty was the proximate cause of the loss sustained." 454 P.2d at 251-52 (as quoted in Justice Rabinowitz's dissent) (footnote omitted)
(emphasis added). However, because defendant's actions need not be the sole proximate
cause of the tort, but only a substantial factor, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431(a)
(1965), a charge of the proximate cause rather than a proximate cause has been held to be
error in other jurisdictions. E.g., Panas v. New Jersey Natural Gas Co., 59 N.J. 255, 258-59,
281 A.2d 520, 522-23 (1971).
29

30
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liability based on breach of implied warranty is both the same as, and
different from, a like finding based on strict liability in tort. Nonetheless, this anomalous result appears to be the clear implication of Dean
Prosser's comment that
all of the trouble lay with the one word "warranty," which had
been from the outset only a rather transparent device to accomplish
the desired result of strict liability. No8 4one disputed that the
"warranty" was a matter of strict liability.

This confusion was the subject of much of the opinion in Ulmer
v. Ford Motor Co., 8 wherein the plaintiff alleged that a bolt holding
the A-frame of a car in which she was a passenger had come loose, thus
making the car uncontrollable and causing a collision with a concrete
abutment. The plaintiff's appeal from an adverse verdict was based
upon the fact that the jury had been instructed to consider negligence
even though the suit had been brought on a theory of strict liability.
The court was concerned with the question of whether the State of
Washington had in effect already adopted the theory of strict liability
in tort, thus obviating any necessity for the plaintiff to prove a specific
act of negligence by Ford. In pursuit of the answer, the court examined
numerous prior cases, which were all couched in the language of breach
of warranty, and concluded:
Section 402A, insofar as it pertains to manufacturers (and we
are concerned in this case with a manufacturer only), is in accord
with the import of our cases which have been decided upon a
theory of breach of implied warranty and we hereby adopt it as
the law of this jurisdiction.8 6
The court then continued:
On a new trial, however, an instruction stating the rule according
to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) should be given,
rather than instruction No. 6, which does not make it clear that
the manufacturer is liable only for defects which create an un7
reasonable risk of harm.8
Prosser, supra note 28, at 802.
35 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969).
86 Id. at 531-32, 452 P.2d at 734.
87 Id. at 532, 452 P.2d at 735. Instruction No. 6 was as follows:
A manufacturer of an automobile is liable to any person if such person is
injured due to a manufacturing defect in such automobile.
If you find that there was a defect in the manufacture of the automobile
which existed at the time of the sale to Mr. Smith, and the plaintiff was injured
as a proximate result of such defect, then I instruct you to find for the plaintiff
and against the defendant.
Id. at 524, 454 P.2d at 730
34
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Thus, the court in Ulmer found that it had, in effect, long since adopted
the theory of strict liability by applying the theory of warranty.
However, it still ordained a change of title and instructions to match.
Clearly, they had concluded that the theories are both the same and
yet somehow different. Perhaps this is a tacit recognition of the conno88
tative distinction previously drawn.
The conclusion arrived at after considering the various cases concerned with the liability of the manufacturer of a motor vehicle is that
he will be liable if the vehicle was defectively constructed, thereby
proximately causing physical injury. There are, to be sure, differences
in approach within this policy. In some cases it appears that negligence
is the theory upon which to proceed. In others, breach of implied
warranty is the basic allegation. Then again, strict liability in tort is
obviously the ever-widening appropriate route for the plaintiff to pursue. 39 Notwithstanding the approach used, liability as a matter-of policy
is settled, leaving only the burden of proof to be met.
Closer analysis reveals, however, that this policy is limited in scope
to those instances where the defects are peculiar to the specific vehicle
in question, as opposed to those attributable to an entire line. Thus,
for example, the finding for the plaintiff in Henningsen raises no implications as to 1955 Plymouths generally; similarly, the language in
Clary is pertinent only to the particular 1966 Thunderbird whose
brakes failed and to no other Thunderbirds produced in that year.
Full understanding of the current state of the law demands recognition
of this important limitation.
CRASHWORTHINESS:

A TENUOUS OR TENABLE THEORY?

The Evans Approach
With the advent of consumerism a new type of automobile products liability suit, commonly referred to as a "second collision" case,
has been thrust upon the courts. These suits are not grounded upon the
theory that a defect in the car caused the primary impact, but rather
that the injuries sustained were exacerbated by a defect in design. The
exacerbation usually occurs as a result of the occupant's collision with
the interior of the vehicle, and thus the term second collision. 40 By
38 See discussion pp. 505-506 supra.
89 See Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 887-911 (1967); Pawlak, Manufacturer's Design Liability: The Expanding Frontiers of the Law, 19 DEFENsE L.J. 143, 144-55
(1970); Prosser, supra note 28, at 791-805.
40 However, the term "second collision" may be a misnomer. Not all design defect
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alleging that the car is defectively designed, in essence a plaintiff is
saying that the manufacturer did precisely what he intended to do, and
that in itself constitutes fault. Consequently, a finding for the plaintiff
based upon such a theory goes beyond the cases discussed in the introduction in terms of its far-reaching implications. This fact has produced a sharp division of judicial opinion and has led the courts into
determinations which often appear to be based on factors outside of
the scope of the cases as well as on normal legal considerations.
The watershed case in this field is Evans v. General Motors Corp.,1
which concerned a federal court's application of Indiana law. Plaintiff's
decedent was killed when his vehicle was struck broadside in a collision
which was, in itself, unconnected with the alleged defect. Plaintiff
alleged that the use of X-frame construction in a 1961 Chevrolet station
wagon constituted negligent design, breach of implied warranty, and
strict liability in tort. The district court granted dismissal on all counts
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and
this decision was affirmed on appeal.
As seen by the majority, the primary issue was "the nature of the
duty which an automobile manufacturer owes to users of its product.

'42

The conclusion was couched in the language of the "intended purpose"
doctrine. As explained by the court:
The intended purpose of an automobile does not include its
participation in collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that such collisions may
8
occur.

4

Although this essentially disposed of the case, the court also expressed
what have become recurring themes in subsequent analogous cases:
A manufacturer is not under a duty to make his automobile
accident-proof or fool-proof .... 44
And
[p]erhaps it would be desirable to require manufacturers to construct automobiles in which it would be safe to collide, but that
cases which exacerbate injuries actually include a separate second collision. For example,
in Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 393, 329 P.2d 605 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958), the
plaintiff, a six-year old boy going for a walk, collided with a radiator ornament which
protruded beyond that portion of the automobile to which it was attached. The ornament
pierced the plaintiff's eye, thus causing a loss of sight. Because the injury occurred simultaneously with the original collision, there was no true "second collision" at hand.
41 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
42 Id. at 824.
48 Id. at 825.
44 Id. at 824.
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would be a legislative45 function, not an aspect of judicial interpretation of existing law.
Thus the Evans court established the following set of principles
to be applied in design defect automobile cases:
(1) The intended purpose of an automobile does not include
collisions with other automobiles;
(2) an automobile manufacturer has no duty to produce an accident-proof vehicle; and
(3) standards of automobile design in regard to questions of
46
safety in the event of a collision are beyond the scope of the judiciaiy.
PropositionI. This first point is, of course, unarguable. In addition,
it is attractive in its simplicity, which perhaps accounts for its frequent
reiteration in later cases. In Shumard v. General Motors Corp.,47 the
plaintiff sued on an alleged defect in the design of the 1962 Corvair, to
wit: dangerous placement of the gas tank causing it to rupture and
ignite the car upon a rear-end collision. The court, citing Evans,
concluded: "[A]n automobile is not made for the purpose of striking

or being struck by other vehicles or objects .. . .48
In Edgar v. Nachman,49 the appellate court affirmed the.trial court's
dismissal of the plaintiff's amended complaint. The plaintiff had alleged
that the gas tank cap and the gas tank itself were improperly designed,
thus causing a fire following an accident. As in Shumard the court
paraphrased Evans:
If the manufacturer does everything necessary to make the product
function for its intended purpose, and its operation creates no danger unknown to the user, then the manufacturer is not liable. 50
45

Id.

However, a strong dissent written by Judge Kiley should be mentioned. In it he
espoused theories which would later be adopted in several majority opinions. See discussion
pp. 516-517 infra. As to the intended purpose of an automobile and the resulting duty of a
manufacturer, he felt that
General Motors' duty was to use such care in designing its automobiles that
reasonable protection is given purchasers against death and injury from accidents
which are expected and foreseeable yet unavoidable by the purchaser despite
careful use.
359 F.2d at 827. He also disagreed with the self-imposed limitation on the judiciary:
[T]he possibility of future adequate legislative standards does not remove the
necessity of presently deciding whether plaintiff should or should not have an
opportunity to prove the allegations made in the complaint.
Id. at 828.
47 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
46

48

Id. at 314.

49

37 App. Div. 2d 86, 323 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1971).
Id. at 88, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 55.

50
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Another case in point is Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp.,5' which,
although discussing the remaining two propositions, pays particular
attention to the intended purpose doctrine. Factually, Walton concerned
a 1963 Plymouth Valiant which was alleged to have been defectively
designed in that a screw holding a nylon plate onto the seat of the
plaintiff's car was sheared when the car was struck in the rear. This
resulted in the driver being flung into the steering wheel and injured.
In addition to his claim of improper design, the plaintiff also alleged
negligence in manufacturing. The issue as phrased by the court was
whether or not it would
extend the strict liability rule to include a case where the defect in
the article sold did not cause the initial accident, but did, when
combined with the force put in motion by the accident, add to, or
become a part of the cause of injury
to a human being, so as to
52
subject manufacturer to liability.

Two conclusions can be drawn from this language. First, the fact that
the allegations encompass defective design as opposed to defective manufacturing is irrelevant: What will control is the occurrence of the second
collision. Second, with respect to these cases, there is no distinction to
be made between design defects based on either strict liability or negligence concepts. The implications of the court's negative conclusions are
clear: Unless the defect complained of, regardless of its source, is the
primary cause of the ensuing injury, liability will not lie with the manufacturer. Indeed, while finding no liability, the court stated that "the
weakness of the bumper and screw did, or could have, added to the
seriousness of the plaintiff's injury." 53 But the opinion continued:
There is no contention in the instant case that the automobile
driven by the plaintiff was not safe for its ordinarily intended use,
or that the "bumper" on the seat was not sufficiently strong for
ordinary highway use of the automobile at the time it left the
factory.5
The duty of the manufacturer, then, does not include preparing
his automobiles for collision, and "[t]his is true although such accident
may have been foreseeable as a misuse of the manufactured product." 55
51 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1970).
52 Id. at 570.
53 Id. See also Courtois v. General Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 542, 182 A.2d 545,
554 (1962).
54 229 So. 2d at 572.
55 Id. See also Burnett v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 833-66 (D.N.J., June 3, 1969),
wherein the court, speaking through Judge Coolahan, set forth New Jersey's position on
this point:
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Thus, Walton carries the first Evans proposition to its ultimate conclusion whereby even clear proof of a defect and proximate causation
are rendered totally irrelevant because the intended purpose of an
automobile does not include its participation in collisions. Accordingly,
the manufacturer has no duty to provide for such occurrences, and
therefore cannot be held liable in second collision cases.
Proposition II. In support of the second proposition the Evans
court cites Campo v. Schofield,56 wherein an onion-topping machine
rather than a motor vehicle caused the injury. Evans relied on the observation by the Campo court that they had "not yet reached the state
where a manufacturer is under the duty of making a machine accident
proof or foolprdof." 57 However, when examined in light of the surrounding circumstances of the case, as well as the context of the law at
the time of the decision, Campo's appropriateness as authority becomes
highly suspect.
The Campo decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals of New
York in 1950, substantially prior in time to the adoption of the theories
The intended use of an automobile does not include, as I think we understand
it in the law of New Jersey, its participation in collisions with other objects, even
though the manufacturer might have forseen the possibility of such collisions.
Id. Slip opinion at -.
56 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
57 Id. at 472, 95 N.E.2d at 804. This sentence in its context is as follows:
If a manufacturer does everything necessary to make the machine function
properly for the purpose for which it is designed, if the machine is without any
latent defect, and if its functioning creates no danger or peril that is not known
to the user, then the manufacturer has satisfied the law's demands. We have not
yet reached the state where a manufacturer is under the duty of making a machine
accident proof or foolproof. Just as the manufacturer is under no obligation,
in order to guard against injury resulting from deterioration, to furnish a machine
that will not wear out ... so he is under no duty to guard against injury from
a patent peril or from a source manifestly dangerous. To illustrate, the manufacturer who makes, properly and free of defects, an axe or a buzz saw or an airplane
with an exposed propeller, is not to be held liable if one using the axe or the
buzz saw is cut by it, or if some one working around the airplane comes in
contact with the propeller. In such cases, the manufacturer has the right to expect
that such persons will do everything necessary to avoid such contact, for the very
nature of the article gives notice and warning of the consequences to be expected,
of the injuries to be suffered. In other words, the manufacturer is under no duty
to render a machine or other article "more" safe-as long as the danger to be
avoided is obvious and patent to all.
Id. (emphasis added). So viewed, its questionable validity regarding application to the
design of the frame of an automobile (Evans) becomes apparent.
Additionally, Edgar v. Nachman, 37 App. Div. 2d 86, 323 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1971), cites
Campo in support of the following:
Liability may not be imposed on a manufacturer solely because his product-is dangerous to use and he has failed to make safety provision against all anticipated
risks. ...He is not required to make a machine that is accident proof or a car that
is crashworthy.
Id. at 88, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
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of breach of implied warranty and strict liability in tort as applied
today. The court specifically noted:
Since there is no claim of privity of contract between the
defendant manufacturer and plaintiff, the complaint cannot, of
course be sustained on any theory of implied warranty. 58
Clearly this passage accurately depicts the status of the law and its concern with the privity requirement-an element which Henningsen, decided ten years later but six years prior to Evans, completely dismissed
when it allowed the wife of the purchaser to recover for the injuries she
sustained. Additionally, Campo turned on the plaintiff's failure to allege
the existence of a latent defect, which was required of a remote user at
the time, but was completely obviated by the advent of strict liability.
When looking to the product involved the support becomes even
more strained. The market for onion-topping machines is negligible in
comparison to that of the auto industry. There is no product in American society which, if defectively constructed, can produce a more devastating result on a greater number of people than the automobile.
This is not to say that liability is to be predicated solely on the impact
a particular product may produce if defectively constructed, but rather
it is a strong element used in formulating the public policy considerations which underlay the present day products liability decisions. Thus,
the extension of the Campo language to contemporary products liability
law, and more specifically to second collision cases, loses a great deal of
59
thrust in the transition.
An interesting litany can be traced in McClung v. Ford Motor
Co.,60 a case adopting the second Evans proposition. The plaintiff alleged the following design defects in a 1965 Ford Mustang: a rigid and
non-collapsible steering wheel and steering column, an unpadded steering wheel, a horn ring that was neither indented nor padded, and the
absence of the shoulder harness and a device to lock the driver's seat
in position. As a result of a second collision, the plaintiff was blinded.
Ford moved for summary judgment on the ground that as a matter of
law it was not liable. The court in ruling on the motion stated:
301 N.Y. at 471, 95 N.E.2d at 803.
59 Despite the apparent questionable basis of the second Evans proposition, other
jurisdictions have found both Evans and Campo to be controlling In Walton v. Chrysler
Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1970) the court stated the proposition to be one
wherein "the automobile manufacturer is not an insurer against the possibility of accidental
injury arising out of the use of its product." Id. at 572. See Edgar v. Nachman, 37 App.
Div. 2d 86, 323 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1971).
60 353 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.W. Va. 1971).
58
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It is the duty of the manufacturer to use reasonable care under the
circumstances so to design its product as to make it not accident or
foolproof, but safe for the functional use for which it was intended,
and this requirement includes a duty to design the product so that
it will fairly meet emergencies which can be reasonably anticipated.
However, a manufacturer is not an insurer that its product is, from
the design viewpoint, incapable of producing injury.61
Thus, the opinion sets forth a positive standard of duty even as to design,
but arrives at a negative conclusion in finding against the plaintiff.
Since the defendant's motion was granted, it is clear that the first proposition in Evans was both included and extended. That is, the language
used, taken in light of the judgment rendered, indicates that a collision
62
is not among "emergencies which can be reasonably anticipated."
In arriving at the decision the court discussed Evans at length, but
also relied on Willis v. Chrysler Corp.63 Willis, the driver of a 1963
Plymouth police car, was killed when the vehicle broke in two following
a collision. The defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted,
with the court flatly stating that
duty does not extend to require a manufacturer to design his product so that it is accident proof or foolproof. 64
The progenitors of the language in Willis were Evans and Gossett
v. Chrysler Corp.65 The latter, however, is not a second collision case
at all. In Gossett the plaintiff alleged that the hood of his Dodge truck
suddenly flew up while he was driving on a highway, thus obscuring his
vision and causing an accident. The court reversed a jury verdict for the
plaintiff, holding that this was a defective design case rather than a
negligence action and that the trial court had thus erred in instructing
the jury as to negligence. Then proceeding to order dismissal rather
than retrial, the court used the language which appeared later nearly
61 Id. at 20 (emphasis added). The court appeared to be paraphrasing the language
from Gossett v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966):
It is the duty of a manufacturer to use reasonable care under the circumstances
to so design his product as to make it not accident or foolproof, but safe for the
use for which it is intended. This duty includes a duty to design the product
so that it will fairly meet any emergency of use which can reasonably be antidpated. The manufacturer is not an insurer that his product is, from a design
viewpoint, incapable of producing injury.
Id. at 87. See note 66 infra and accompanying text.
62 See 333 F. Supp. at 20. However, the court failed to give an example of what it
considered to be an emergency.
63 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
64 Id. at 1011.
65 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966).
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McClung.6 6

verbatim in
It would appear that both Willis and McClung
were built, at least partially, on a case which is really of a different
quality than either of them.
Two conclusions can be drawn regarding the second Evans proposition. First, the cases accepting this view, while drawing upon one another for precedent, are all based to some extent, as was Evans itself,
on one or two common sources which are of doubtful validity when
applied to automobiles generally and are even more doubtful when
applied to the second collision situation. Second, the very proposition
has the look of a straw man. In no case is it indicated that any plaintiff
was claiming that the manufacturer was under a duty to build an accident proof car. Instead, the courts themselves have taken allegations of
specific faults and expanded them into a much more easily deflatable
premise. Thus, even if the proposition that a manufacturer need not
produce an accident proof car is accepted as gospel, it is really irrelevant
in those cases which refer to it since the plaintiffs made no claim that
this duty ever existed.
PropositionIII. While the first two propositions yield, for better
or worse, conclusions of law at least purportedly drawn from the facts
at issue, the third proposition constitutes an unwarranted timidity on
the part of the Evans court which has been adopted by its followers.
By depicting the determination of standards for crashworthiness as a
legislative function, the courts have limited their own power to hear
and decide cases.
The progenitor of this proposition as it appears in Evans is again
Campo. The Campo court considered the contention that manufacturers should be compelled to equip complicated machinery with all
possible safeguards, since these contrivances had created so many new
dangers. However, it concluded:
If, however, the manufacturer's liability is to be so extended, if so
fundamental a change is to be effected, we deem it the function of
the legislature rather than of the courts to achieve that change.6 7
This argument is expanded on in Walton, and finds its fullest exposition in McClung. While both courts espouse a philosophy of judicial restraint, it is noteworthy that Walton appears to base its view on
the impact that defective design litigation would have on the courts
while enforcing and policing standards,68 while McClung is equally
66 Id. at 87. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
67 301 N.Y. at 475, 95 N.E.2d at 805.
68 The court stated:
What standards of duty or reasonableness of design would we require, and how
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solicitous of its economic impact on manufacturers. 69 Taken together
these views constitute the rationale for the third rule of Evans.
Furthermore, this self-imposed limitation has not been applied to
second collision cases alone. Demonstrative of this view is Schemel v.
General Motors Corp.,7° decided subsequent to Evans but by the same
court. In Schemel, the complaint was not directed at the manufacturer
of plaintiff's own car but against that of a 1960 Chevrolet Impala which
struck plaintiff's vehicle from the rear at 115 miles per hour. The plaintiff relied upon the unusual theory that the defendant manufacturer was
unreasonable in designing a car which was capable of attaining an admittedly unlawful speed. Thus, there was no second collision at issue.
71
Nonetheless, the court, with Judge Kiley dissenting as he had in Evans,
affirmed the dismissal on the same grounds as in its previous opinion.
The court quoted with approval the language of the trial judge, who
could the judiciary police the industry? These questions are unanswerable. The
courts have no machinery to inspect and police industry so as to require compliance with detailed design of products.
229 So. 2d at 573.
69 The McClung court commented:
The adoption of the legal theory propounded by the plaintiff would impose
on the manufacturer of service products a duty not contemplated by the common
law, and not founded in reason in view of the impact such a rule would impose
on the basic industry in our economic complex. . . . If certain requirements for
uniform automobile design are to be imposed upon the manufacturers thereof,
then it is for the legislative bodies to make such a determination after full
consideration of its political and economic implications.
333 F. Supp. at 20.
70 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968).
71 As he had in Evans, Judge Kiley strongly dissented. In addition to alleging the
unreasonableness of the defendant in designing a car capable of such an unlawful speed,
the plaintiff had also alleged that the defendant was under a duty in advertising to
conceal the reserve power built into the car to avoid possible abuse by a careless driver.
384 F.2d at 805. Judge Kiley utilized the fact that the reserve power was not concealed in
deciding that the operation of the car at high speeds was an intended use:
I think it is illogical and inequitable to rule that Bigham's use of the unlawful
speed capacity was unintended, when General Motors has promoted the lawless
speed capacity of his and other cars and allegedly encouraged him to use it.
Id. at 808.
Also, he once again expressed his opinion of the court's self-imposed limitation on
hearing second collision cases:
The fact that setting safety standards for the automobile industry may
preferably be left to Congress does not justify dismissing the Schemel complaint.
... The Act does not purport to create causes of action or to compensate victims,
so that courts will still be called upon to decide liability for violation of the
standards established ....
The relatively small financial penalty for violation of
the standards will hardly have the deterrent effect that suits for large awards
of damages should have. Manufacturers may choose however to risk or bear the
financial cost of violation as a lesser evil than the cost of upgrading the safety
features of its products.
Id. at 810 (footnote omitted).
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had apparently adopted the Evans view as a basis for his decision when
he suggested that "[t]he problem of devising standards of safety for the
72
manufacturer of automobiles is a legislative problem."
The Larsen Approach
While the views expressed by Judge Kiley in his dissent in Evans
did not prevail in his own jurisdiction, his influence was felt in the
leading pro-liability second collision case of Larsen v. General Motors
Corp.73 In fact, the Larsen court discussed Evans at some length since it

was the basis of the district court decision which was reversed. The
plaintiff sued to recover for severe injuries suffered when the steering
mechanism of his 1963 Chevrolet Corvair was thrust into his head immediately following a rear-end impact.
The action, as in Evans and Schemel, was brought on a theory of
negligence rather than strict liability. Specifically, the allegations were
of negligence in design of the steering assembly and failure to warn of
the dangerous condition that it created. In addition, breach of express
74
and implied warranties were pleaded.
After rejecting all the Evans propositions, the court of appeals reversed and remanded a summary judgment rendered in favor of the
manufacturer. As to the intended purpose doctrine it said:
While automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with
each other, a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use will result in collisions and injury-producing impacts.
• ..The sole function of an automobile is not just to provide a
means of transportation, it is to provide a means of safe transportation or as safe as is reasonably possible under the present state of
75
the art.

Also, the court appeared to regard the accident-proof proposition with
some disdain:
We do agree that under the present state of the art an automobile manufacturer is under no duty to design an accident-proof or
foolproof vehicle or even one that floats on water, but such manuId. at 805 (quoting from 261 F. Supp. 134, 136 (S.D. Ind. 1966)).
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
74 Id. at 497. As previously noted, the breach of warranty theory is tantamount to,
if not identical with, a strict liability approach with respect to the legal implications
and their connotative impact upon a jury. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. As
to the effect of the negligence approach, see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1069 (1960), where the author notes that
an honest estimate might very well be that there is not one case in a hundred
in which strict liability would result in recovery where negligence does not.
Id. at 1114.
75 391 F.2d at 502.
72
73
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facturer is under a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its
vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of
76
injury in the event of a collision.
Finally, regarding the third proposition, the court echoed the
Evans and Schemel dissents in concluding that judicial action in the
field of auto safety was consistent with, and a valuable supplement to,
7
legislative action.
Significantly, the court noted that it was not dealing with a strict
liability case. Nonetheless, as an examination of the evolving cases reveals, Larsen has led inexorably toward the application of strict liability
in cases involving second collision.
In Mieher v. Brown,78 the court was concerned with an alleged
design defect in an International Harvester truck. Finding Larsen to be
more cogent than Evans, the court concluded that
[a] manufacturer should be held to the exercise of ordinary
care to avoid the creation of such risks to the public. We see no
great burden being placed on the industry if it is asked to use
common sense and ordinary care in design. What logic distin76 Id. This language may well have been invited by overstatement committed in
Evans and the cases that followed it. For example, the court held in Shumard that
[t]he duty of a manufacturer in the design of automobiles does not include
designing a "fireproof" automobile or an automobile in which passengers are
guaranteed to be safe from fire. A manufacturer has no duty to design an automobile that will not catch fire under any circumstances.
270 F. Supp. at 313.
What Larsen did was to see this approach for what it is-a straw man. Certainly,
the plaintiff in Shumard never made such a claim, any more than the plaintiff in Evans
had suggested that the defendants should produce an accident-proof car. Rather, each
plaintiff, as in any tort case, merely alleged that what had occurred resulted from a
specific fault of the defendant. Thus in Shumard, the alleged wrong was not the failure
to build a fireproof car but the failure to properly place the gas tank so that it would not
rupture upon collision. In Evans, the alleged fault was designing and using a frame
which could not withstand a broadside collision, not failure to produce an accident-proof
car.
77 Specifically, the court stated:
General Motors contends that any safety standards in design and equipment
should be imposed as envisioned by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966 ....
It is apparent that the National Traffic Safety Act is intended to be supplementary of and in addition to the common law of negligence and product
liability. The common law is not sterile or rigid and serves the best interests
of society by adapting standards of conduct and responsibility that fairly meet
the emerging and developing needs of our time. The common law standard
of a duty to use reasonable care in light of all the circumstances can at least
serve the needs of our society until the legislature imposes higher standards or
the courts expand the doctrine of strict liability for tort. The Act is a salutary
step in this direction and not an exemption from common law liability.
391 F.2d at 506.
78 3 Ill. App. Sd 802, 278 N.E.2d 869 (1972).
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guishes a duty to exercise care in manufacture from a duty to exercise equal care in design? Failure to do so in either step in the
production of a vehicle may result in disagreeable consequences to
79
the collision victim.
The language used is clearly that of negligence, which is consistent with
the court's statement: "To put the matter bluntly, there is no cause of
action in this state for strict liability in tort for negligent design."80
Mickle v. Blackmon"' also follows Larsen by rejecting the "intended purpose" doctrine of Evans.82 Mickle follows general negligence
principles and credits Larsen as its main authority for doing so. Strict
liability, while not flatly rejected as in Mieher, is simply not considered.
While Mickle and Mieher take the negligence tack, other cases purporting to follow the Larsen rationale have clearly gone beyond it and
have found that the theory of strict liability is applicable to design
defect cases.
The first stages of the transition from negligence to strict liability
appear in Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp.83 The case involved a
gas tank which ruptured following an accident, thus resulting in a fire.
In deciding what duty the automobile manufacturer owed to the users
of its product, the court noted that although no decision construing the
law of the jurisdiction could be found, products liability cases were to
be governed by strict liability in tort. The court, in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, quoted Larsen at length and found it "most
persuasive."8 4 Clearly, it found the reasoning of Larsen adequate and
saw no necessity to discuss the strict liability theory.
Another transitional case is Gray v. General Motors Corp.,85
wherein the plaintiffs' Corvair was involved in a head-on collision with
another car which had crossed the center line of a highway. The plaintiffs alleged that their injuries were aggravated by the failure of their
vehicle to have a pop-out windshield and an energy-absorbing steering
mechanism. The appellate court noted that the case had been submitted
to the jury "on theories of negligence and strict liability for distribution
of a product unreasonably dangerous because of its defective design."s 6
The appellants contended that the trial court erred in the instruction
79 Id. at 812, 278 NXE.2d at 876.

80 Id. at 805, 278 N.E.2d at 872.
81 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
82 Although the court did follow Larsen it reversed the judgment for the plaintiff
and remanded the case on the basis of a faulty instruction.
83 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
84 Id. at 304-06.
85 434 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1970).
86 Id. at 111.
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of these principles as the applicable law. By affirming the decision
below, the court may be viewed as implicitly accepting the charge of
strict liability. This is of particular interest, since Gray, like Larsen two
years earlier, was decided on the basis of Minnesota law as applied by
the federal court of appeals.
Badorek v. General Motors Corp.,87 decided shortly after Grund-

manis, held that strict liability was clearly applicable to second collision
cases. 88 The plaintiff's Corvette Sting Ray, like the auto in Grundmanis,
burst into flames when its gas tank was ruptured by a rear end collision.
Although this court followed Larsen in result, it went beyond it in
theory by approving the application of strict liability, as evidenced by
the following conclusion:
[W]e hold that such manufacturers are strictly liable for enhanced
injuries ("the second accident") caused by unreasonably dangerous
defective design and construction of their products under the conditions described in section 402A (which conditions exist in this
case). 8 9
11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
However, as noted by two authors, a procedural quirk appears to nullify the true
legal impact of Badorek. Hoenig and Werber, Automobile "Crashworthiness":An Untenable
Doctrine, 20 CLEv. STATE L. REV. 578, 587 n.35 (1971). The Supreme Court of California
subsequently granted a hearing on January 14, 1971. See 90 Cal. Rptr. at 305. Under
California law, the grant of a hearing by the supreme court invalidates the lower decision
by the court of appeal. Ponce v. Marr, 47 Cal. 2d 159, 161, 301 P.2d 837, 839 (1956). At
the hearing the cause was retransferred back to the court of appeal, where it was dismissed
with the agreement of both parties on April 19, 1971. 11 Cal. App. 3d at 902.
Although Badorek itself is technically meaningless, in actuality its principles have been
adopted and extended by the California Supreme Court in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
89 11 Cal. App. 3d at 925, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 320. Additionally, the court rejected the
defendant's contention that determining design defects is beyond the ability of a jury of
laymen. The court, through analogy, stated:
Juries decide medical malpractice and personal injury actions where damages
are fixed by them on the basis of medical experts testifying to the most complex
matters. Juries also establish values testified to by real estate appraisers using
many factors difficult to apply. We have read the testimony of the experts in the
case at bench. We find it no more difficult for a layman to comprehend than
experts' opinions in many other types of litigation.
Id. at 924, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
For a more recent development in the strict liability approach, see Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972), where the subject
of the litigation was a Chevrolet stepvan with built-in bread racks. The van was forced
off the road and made a sudden stop, whereupon the racks broke loose and struck and
injured the driver. The plaintiff prevailed on a theory of strict liability. Of particular
interest is the holding that the plaintiff was not required to prove the causative defect
condition which made the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. This,
of course, goes beyond the limits of § 402 A, and is an application of the Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), theory of enterprise
87
88
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Unequivocally then, the acceptance of the reasoning in Larsen had led
to adoption of the theory of strict liability in tort as an approach to
second collision design defect cases.
The ultimate extension of the application of the Larsen approach
appears in Passwaters v. General Motors Corp.9o The court in Passwaters was faced with an unusual defective design situation. The plaintiff was a passenger on a motorcycle which collided with a 1964 Buick
Skylark. Her leg came in contact with a wheel cover consisting of unshielded metal flanges which, while turning at a high rate of speed,
caused a "severe lacerating injury." 91 In reversing a directed verdict for
the defendant, the court discussed the applicability of strict liability.
First it concluded that this theory had in fact already been accepted in
its jurisdiction. The court then proceeded to decide whether a bystander, who like this plaintiff was not the purchaser or user of the
alleged defective product, could avail himself of the theory. The answer
was in the affirmative: "'If anything, bystanders should be entitled to
greater protection than the consumer or user where injury to bystanders from the defect is reasonably foreseeable.' "92 If strict liability is
accepted in second collision cases, the application of the Larsen approach to one in the position of the plaintiff in Passwaters is certainly
logical, because the measure of exposure is forseeability instead of
privity of contract.
Clearly, the progression from negligence to the fullest acceptance of
strict liability appears to have occurred in what might be called "The
Larsen Chain," which tacitly recognizes that there is really no logical
justification for applying the theory of negligence while denying that of
strict liability in tort.
liability to a second collision design defect. Thus, it also appears to go beyond Badorek
as well.
90 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972).
91 Id. at 1272.
92 Id. at 1279 (quoting from Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451
P.2d 84, 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 657 (1969)) (emphasis added by court). The court continued
to quote from Elmore:
"Consumers and users, at least, have the opportunity to inspect for defects and to
limit their purchases to articles manufactured by reputable manufacturers and
sold by reputable retailers, where as the bystander ordinarily has no such
opportunities. In short, the bystander is in greater need of protection from defective products which are dangerous, and if any distinction should be made between
bystanders and users, it should be made, contrary to the position of defendants,
to extend greater liability in favor of the bystanders."
454 F.2d at 1279. Thus, when an automobile is the subject of the controversy, the foreseeable victim of a defect is just as likely to be anyone along the path of the ever-changing
zone of danger as is the driver himself.
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Thus, Larsen and the cases which have followed it have themselves
established a set of principles paralleling those of Evans:
(1) While an automobile is not intended to collide with other automobiles, it is foreseeable and perhaps even likely that it will eventually do so;
(2) an automobile manufacturer has a duty to provide a vehicle in
which the hazards of collision are minimized as much as is reasonably
possible within the limitations of the "state of the art" at the time of its
production; and
(3) second collision cases involving design defects are as appropriate for judicial determination as any other type of tort action.
Therefore, just as the Evans principles will bar second collision
recovery in all cases, the reasoning of Larsen will assure it upon proof
of the causal design defect.
Negligence v. Strict Liability: Different Proofs?
In terms of the burden of proof borne by a plaintiff in a second
collision case, it must not be assumed that the law of negligence has
been rendered irrelevant by the progression toward strict liability.
Rather, the former's vitality is indicated by a comparison of the elements of proof present in a negligence action with those found in a
case brought on either the Restatement or Greenman theory.
In Larsen, a negligence action, the plaintiff in the course of his case
had to prove that the defendant was in the business of selling Corvairs
which were expected to and did reach the consumer in a substantially
unchanged condition. Additionally, he had to prove a proximately
caused defect resulting from the negligence of General Motors.9 3 The
fact that proof of this defect also proved a breach of duty owed by the
manufacturer is indicated by the language of the court:
The duty of reasonable care in design should be viewed in light
of the risk. While all risks cannot be eliminated nor can a crashproof vehicle be designed under the present state of the art, there
are many common-sense factors in design, which are or should be
well known to the manufacturer that will minimize or lessen the
injurious effects of a collision. The standard of reasonable care is
93 For in depth discussions of proof of defects, see Forde, Products Liability--Use of
CircumstantialEvidence and Inferences To Prove That a Product Was Defective and That
the Defect Existed When the Product Left Defendant's Control, 16 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE
42 (1972); Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. RExv. 325
(1971).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:499

applied in many other negligence situations and should be applied
94
here.
In short, proof of negligence is built into proof of the defect; thus,
risks which cannot be eliminated are not held to be actionable defects.
The risks which can be eliminated by the exercise of due care, but are
not, are actionable both as defects and as breaches of the standard of
reasonable care-negligence.
One might assume that this conclusion is reached because a greater
quantum of proof is required in negligence than in strict liability, and
therefore, proof of the former includes proof of the latter. That this is,
in fact not the case is demonstrated by an examination of Badorek,
which takes the strongest of positions in justifying the application of
the 402 A strict liability theory to second collision cases. There a Corvette was struck in the rear, and its gas tank ruptured producing either
gasoline or gasoline fumes in the passenger compartment which immediately burst into flames. Since the plaintiffs relied on a strict liability
theory, their proofs had to conform to Section 402A which provides in
part:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property .... 95
Thus it was plaintiffs' burden to prove that the Corvette was defectively designed in regard to the placement of the gas tank, and that
this defect rendered the car unreasonably dangerous. They met that
burden.
It is of particular interest to examine the first element under section 402 A-proof of the defect. Clearly all defects are not actionable.
This differentiation may be deduced from the trial court's discussion of
evidence which would indicate the "state of the art":
[i]f you can show that there is a standard in the industry-if there
was in 1965-in relation to where a gas tank should be placed, I
would be inclined to permit evidence on that .... "96
And, in fact, such evidence was admitted as to other sports cars.
Such evidence is admissible because
[i]t is pertinent and tends to show due care that the plan or design
94 391 F.2d at 503 (emphasis added).
95 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

402A (1965).

96 11 Cal. App. 3d at 935, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 328 (quoting from trial court's opinion).
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used by a manufacturer is common to the industry and has been
97
free from injury producing effects in the past.
It would appear that General Motors might have overcome the
assertion of a defect in the design of its product by showing that it exercised "due care" in choosing it. The implication is apparent-the
finding of a defect is dependant upon a showing of a deviation from
required due care, the basic component of negligence. Once again, it
appears that had the negligence theory alone been available, the result
would have been the same.
Thus, even where section 402 A is the guiding theory of a case, it is
not sufficient for the plaintiff merely to prove a defect. He must in fact
prove that it was unreasonable of the manufacturer to have created it.
When the manufacturer fails to conform to the state of the art, there
obviously arises an implication that he acted in an unreasonable manner. Additionally, when the manufacturer has met the standards of the
industry he may, nonetheless, breach his duty if the product is rendered
so dangerous that its very production and distribution constitutes a
breach of due care.
With respect to the Greenman approach, it is noteworthy that Badorek makes no distinction as to proof between that theory and Section
402A. Additionally, in Greenman itself, expert testimony regarding the
state of the art was introduced, and the court recognized that these
proofs could support a finding of negligence.
Therefore the conclusion reached is that under either strict liability theory, "defect" really means "unreasonable defect," and the proofs
must be so directed. Thus, as proof of negligence rests on a showing of
failure of the manufacturer to act reasonably, proof of strict liability
in second collisions actually carries the same requirement as to the
defect.
However, this analysis is not intended to imply that the cases
which apply section 402 A to these types of occurrences are not meaningful. Rather, it appears that they represent an attempt to shed the
encrusted history of the law of negligence by invoking a separate vocabulary which is more specifically pointed and thus, hopefully, more
effective in dealing with a still evolving legal situation. Further, even if
the ultimate meaning of this new set of words is the same as the old,
their effect is not. The distinction already noted" between the effect
97 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODucTS LIABILITY § 7.01[4], at 112.9 (1971)

omitted).
98 See discussion pp. 505-506 supra.

(footnote
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of an instruction phrased in the language of warranty and that of strict
liability in tort is equally applicable when comparing strict liability
with negligence. In either case, strict liability language is plaintifforiented.
CONCLUSION

It is certainly not unique to products liability that in the American
legal system the recognition or success of a cause of action will be determined by the situs of the controversy. While jurisdictional boundary
lines may not be visually discernable, the realities of their effects on the
law are manifest.
Furthermore, it seems to be generally recognized that distinctions
based on locale are not always desirable. This is exemplified by the
almost unanimous legislative acceptance of the Uniform Commercial
Code.9 9 Uniformity in automobile design defect cases is at least as desirable as uniformity in business transactions-if not more so. An individual undertaking a course of business may, by contract or otherwise,
provide in advance for various contingencies. Conversely, with automobile collisions, many are unavoidable and all contain a strong element
of pure chance. For example, in both Badorek and Schemel the plaintiffs' cars were struck in the rear by reckless drivers. In each case the
very identity of the plaintiff was purely fortuitous.
An even more pointed demonstration results from a comparison
of Badorek with Shumard. The allegations of the plaintiff were identical-defective design in the placement of the gasoline tank. In Shumard
the plaintiff never got past the complaint stage since his accident occurred in Ohio.100 However, Badorek, brought in California, not only
survived a motion for summary judgment but was apparently ultimately successful.' 0 ' This discrepancy becomes even more perplexing
when one considers that if the plaintiff's decedent in Shumard had only
had the "foresight" to cross the border into Pennsylvania before having
10 2
his collision a cause of action would have at least existed.
The unreasonableness of this type of result is further demonstrated
when one examines the nature of the defendant. In the normal tort case
the defendant has a specific locale which will, in the usual course of
99 As of 1972, 49 states and the District of Columbia had adopted the Code, See
(Official West Text 1972).
100 270 F. Supp. at 315. See discussion p. 509 supra.
101 See discussion pp. 519-20 supra.
102 See Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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events, correspond with the locus of the accident. However, this is not
true where the defendant is a manufacturer of automobiles. Although
the manufacturers' operations span a wide geographic area, no manufacturer produces differently designed cars for individual jurisdictions.
Thus, the makers have impliedly recognized the existence of a norm
of acceptability in the manufacturing of automobiles. If this recognition provides an impetus for judicial acceptance of the need for uniformity, the present divergence of legal standards as demonstrated by
Evans and Larsen could be reconciled. Moreover, uniformity would
avoid the unreasonable and untold effect upon both the maker and the
user of the automobile. 103
Of course, the question of what this consistent legal standard ought
to be remains unanswered. If the Evans approach is accepted, the problem is solved by abdication of responsibility: Insofar as the courts are
concerned, there is no necessity to discuss standards for second collision
cases, because no deviation will be actionable under any circumstances.
Thus, acceptibility of design will be decided by the manufacturer, a
decision from which there can be no appeal.
The proponents of this premise argued in Larsen that an expanded
duty of care in design "'must be considered in its application to all
products. Automobile manufacturers cannot be made a special class.' "104
And yet in requesting this blanket immunity was not the manufacturer
actually pleading that he be placed in a "special class?" There is no
other group of producers whose actions are non-reviewable, nor should
there be. To permit such self-policing is to blind oneself to the obvious
103 For a clear demonstration of this problem compare Marshall v. Ford Motor Co.,
446 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1971), with Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss.
1970). In both cases the gist of the complaint and the alleged proximate cause of the
injury was the collapse of the front seat caused by an impact with another car. The two
cars were a 1966 Ford Galaxie and a 1963 Plymouth Valiant, respectively. The Ford seat
had a restraining device which broke upon impact, while the Plymouth had no such
device at all. However, because the Walton court expressly noted the inadequacy of the
device on the Plymouth, it can be assumed the cases meet on common ground.
In Marshall, the federal court assumed the law of the State of Oklahoma to be represented by § 402 A. The court gave no evidence that cases involving second collision were to
be treated any differently than other strict liability cases. Nor did the court go beyond
its case to consider social and economic potentialities as did Walton. In fact, Marshall
implicitly rejects all of the theories expressed in Walton by finding that the trial court
was correct when it "held Ford to strict liability for a defective product unreasonably
dangerous to the user." 446 F.2d at 715.
Walton held that a manufacturer should not be an insurer against the chance of
accidental injury arising out of its product. It specifically rejected the Larsen contentions,
and, relying heavily on Evans, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See discussion
pp. 510-11 supra.
104 391 F.2d at 504.
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-the interests of the manufacturer are not synonymous with those of
the driver, passenger or bystander. The automobile manufacturers, as
businessmen, are profit-oriented and rightly so. However, to allow the
manufacturer to judge the standards of his industry where profit motives collide with safety needs is a questionable tenet. This divergence
of interests has been recognized and dealt with by the legislative branch
of government. 105 Currently, only the courts treat this problem as one
to be left to the individual manufacturers. This timidity can only lead
to the result noted by one author, as quoted in Badorek, that manufacturers " 'have not developed safety in design at the rate which should
be expected from the highly profitable automobile industry.'"106
It must be recognized that despite Larsen's acceptance that automobile makers should not be treated as a special class of manufacturers,
second collision cases are by their very nature a special class. Aside from
the quantitative differences which may exist between motor vehicles
and other products, the character of the incidents which underpin
Evans, Larsen and the rest also sets them apart qualitatively from all
other product liability actions. While all products can precipitate an
action based on a design defect, only motor vehicles can be involved in
accidents wherein the design defect did not cause the collision but
rather aggravated the injuries which were sustained. 10 7 This distinction
makes it desirable to develop standards which are free from the
shackles of analogy that have frequently thwarted the adoption of innovative and progressive theories of law. 08
105 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2709-12 (1966). This report contributed to the eventual passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (1970).
106 11 Cal. App. 3d at 924, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 320. (quoting from Note, Liability for
Negligent Automobile Design, 52 Iowa L. Rev. 953, 956 (1967)). Some courts have noted
that a standard should not be accepted merely because it has been adopted in a particular
industry. The United States Supreme Court in Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Behymer, 189 US.
468 (1903), in an opinion by justice Holmes, stated:
What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought
to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is
complied with or not.
Id. at 470. See also Wellenheider v. Rader, 49 N.J. 1, 7, 227 A.2d 329, 332 (1967); Shafer v.
H.B. Thomas Co., 53 N.J. Super. 19, 22-23, 146 A.2d 483, 485 (App. Div. 1958).
107 In characterizing the automobile as the only vehicle which could be involved in a
second collision, certain factors are considered. All means of public transportation such as
buses, trains, and airplanes may be the subject of litigation, but they carry an additional
element of contractual liability as vehicles of public carriers. Admittedly, motorboats could
be involved in second collision accidents. However, the likelihood that two boats will
collide makes such an event negligible in comparison with the occurrence of automobile
accidents.
108 See discussion of Campo v. Scofield, pp. 511-14 supra. See also Sturm v. Uurich, 10
F.2d 9 (8th Cir. 1925) wherein the court stated:
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To accomplish this, a foundation of certain general principles must
be formulated.
1. It is the duty of the manufacturer of a motor vehicle to provide
something more than merely a mode of transportation.
2. The manufacturer shall not be under a duty to design or produce a motor vehicle incapable of exacerbating injuries.
The adoption of these two principles will remove from any case
the following two propositions which, although specious, have managed
to create difficulties for the courts. By adopting the first principle, the
motorist will be spared being told that, contrary to what his own senses
and his experiences have told him, a car manufacturer never intended
him to think that his car was anything more than a mere mode of transportation. The second principle provides legitimate protection for the
manufacturer, confirming that it is not an insurer of users of its product.
Together these principles implicitly assure that the matter of secondary
collision liability is justiciable.
At trial, the plaintiff must establish the existence of the defect
complained of with specificity and its proximate relationship to his injuries. This latter facet is not peculiar to this type of action, as it has
long been accepted practice for juries to apportion damages in appropriate cases. 10 9 Accordingly, no new set of rules need be formulated.
Regarding the aspect of defect in design, however, such simplicity of
solution is not possible. Allegations of defects in design range from the
most complex aspects of engineering to the most simple. 110
Nonetheless, the following yardstick can be applied to the preceding variants of design complexity. If the plaintiff can prove that the
manufacturer has, in designing the specific part of the vehicle which
is claimed to have been defective, deviated from the care, skill and
knowledge constituting the norm in the industry at the time of design
or manufacture, he shall have proven his case. The burden then shifts
to the manufacturer who thereafter has the burden of proving that this
deviation did not increase the hazard. This is not a revolutionary proposal since it is what traditionally occurs in cases of this nature."'
But analogy does not mean identity. It implies difference. Also, the attendant
use of established terminology only adds to the danger of carrying an analogy too
far.
Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
109 See, e.g., Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REv. 413 (1937).
110 E.g., Schneider v. Chrysler Corp., 401 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1968) (vent window);
Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 393, 329 P.2d 605 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (hood
ornament).
111 In Badorek, for example, much of the opinion deals with the testimony of
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However, what is left unstandardized is the specific legal effect of
such testimony. This approach, as is suggested by the language of Larsen, obviously rings of the proof requirements in medical malpractice
cases. However, the parallel with malpractice should go no further since
the plaintiff should not be foreclosed by an inadequate industry norm.
Rather, should the alleged defect be consistent with the industry standard at the time of design or manufacture, the existence of such a
standard should be evidentiary in its effect, and the plaintiff should
then be entitled to show that the industry standard is unacceptable.
Thus, the effect, although making the plaintiff's burden more onerous,
will help to avoid the risk of the automobile industry formulating its
own subjective standards. If the plaintiff succeeds in meeting his burden of proof by showing defective design according to industry standards, the defendant must then come forward with the proof that its
deviation did not constitute an increased hazard. If he fails, a verdict
as to liability should be directed for the plaintiff.
If, however, the plaintiff demonstrates that the industry's own
standard is inadequate, he shall then have made out a prima facie case.
The finder of fact will then be free to decide for either litigant, regardless of what defense the manufacturer offers.
In either instance, in addition to the proposition that the condition
complained of was not a defect, the only other available defense should
be lack of proximate causation of the injury. This defense shall apply
only to the specifics of the damage claim. Accordingly, as a matter of
law, the initial collision shall not constitute such an intervening cause
as to break the chain of causation. This view will effectively eliminate
the employment of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk
in second collision cases. In the past, these defenses have been somewhat
112
vexatious in strict liability cases generally.
Regarding contributory negligence, the New Jersey supreme court
noted recently in Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp.n s that "[c]ontributory negligence may be a defense to a strict liability action as well
as to a negligence action." 114 However, in Bexiga, the manufacturer had
failed to provide safety devices on a power press and the court observed:
conflicting experts. 11 Cal. App. 3d at 927-30, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 322-24. In Evans, the court
notes plaintiff's offer of expert opinion. 359 F.2d at 824.
112 See Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968 UTAH
L. REv. 267; Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1972). See also Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240 (1972).
113 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972). See generally Note, Products Liability-The
Manufacturer is Responsible for Installing "Feasible" Safety Devices on Unreasonably
DangerousMachinery, 4 SETON HALL L. Rav. 397 (1972).
114 60 N.J. at 412, 290 A.2d at 286.
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The asserted negligence of plaintiff-placing his hand under

the ram while at the same time depressing the foot pedal-was the
very eventuality the safety devices were designed to guard against. It
would be anomalous to hold that defendant has a duty to install
safety devices but a breach of that duty results in no liability for

the very injury the duty was meant to protect against. 115

The anomaly noted is equally evident in second collision cases.

Assumption of the risk is based on the proposition that the plaintiff, with full understanding of the potential consequences of his act,
brought his injuries upon himself. The act referred to, however, is not
intended to include such activities as speeding, careless driving, or even
reckless or drunken driving, since the aforementioned anomoly would

then come into play. Thus, this defense would, as to second collision
cases, be more illusory than real. For example in Cintrone v. Hertz
Truck Leasing & Rental Service"16 the driver was injured when his brakes
failed and his truck was unable to clear an overhead bridge. No second
collision was involved, but a defense which resembled assumption of
the risk was permitted because the driver apparently had full knowledge of the questionable condition of the brakes before he began his
trip. Had his injuries been enhanced by being impaled on a stationary
steering column, one could certainly not assert that he had assumed
the risk of that occurrence with full knowledge of its consequences.
Accordingly, unless some unforeseeable set of circumstances should
occur, assumption of the risk should be no more available as a defense
in these cases than should simple contributory negligence.
An application of this approach to second collision cases should
produce an instruction for the jury which reaches to the heart of the
controversy. Had it been employed by the court in Evans, the following
instructions would have been given:
The plaintiff has endeavored to prove by expert testimony that
the 1961 Chevrolet station wagon produced and sold by the defendant deviated in design from the standards generally applied to
passenger cars of like kind in that the defendant designed and
built its vehicle with an X-frame though the norm in use at the
time of manufacture was an A-frame. If you are convinced by the
testimony that this design did, in fact, constitute a deviation from
the norm, you are instructed to find that this deviation did in fact
constitute a defect unless you have been convinced by the testimony
of defendant's experts that this deviation did not add to the hazard
encountered by the plaintiff in this case.
Alternatively, the plaintiff has produced testimony that design115 Id.

116 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
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ing and producing this station wagon with an X-frame constituted
a defect in design in itself. That is: regardless of comparison with
any other passenger cars this design is unacceptable in regard to
the hazard it produces to the user of the product. Defendant, of
course, has produced testimony to the contrary. You are instructed
to weigh all the evidence and testimony presented to you in this
regard and to decide whether or not you are convinced that this
design, standing on its own merits, does in fact constitute a defect.
If you find that the design of the X-frame in the station wagon
produced by the defendant neither deviated from the norm, or if
it did, that this deviation did not increase the hazard to the plaintiff, or if you find that, taken independently, the design of the
X-frame did not constitute a defect as described above, you are to
find for the defendant.
However, if you find that the defendant did deviate in the
design of its frame from the norm as represented by the standards
employed by producers of passenger cars of like kind generally, and
you find further that you are convinced that such deviation increased the hazard to the plaintiff, or if you find that, regardless of
what other manufacturers have done, the design of the X-frame
constituted a defect, as described above, you are to find for the
plaintiff.
The instruction must then continue to the effect that should the jury
find for the plaintiff as to liability, it is then to proceed to the issue
of damages.
Had these proposed instructions been applied by the Evans court,
the trial of the issues would have turned on two questions. First, was
the X-frame a deviation from the industry norm, and if so did this increase the hazard involved to the driver and passengers in the event of
a collision? Secondly, regardless of the industry norm, was the design
of the frame, standing alone, dangerous to the point of being a defect?
By such tests neither adversary would be unduly prejudiced. On the
one hand, the plaintiff would not be compelled to suffer injury from
invisible hazards which were beyond his legitimate perception without
a remedy in the courts. On the other hand, the maker of the product is
being asked to do no more than to defend his action and be judged by
the public as represented by a jury. Such an approach will serve to properly balance the rights and interests of the parties to each controversy
and bring consistency into a field in which logic dictates that consistency should prevail.

